Indonesia is the world's largest importer of its staple food, rice. Since the economic crisis of 1998, rice import policy has become increasingly 
Introduction
In staple food importing countries, policies affecting the quantities and prices of those imports are always politically sensitive. This is especially true of developing countries, where staple foods normally account, on the consumption side, for a large share of consumers' budgets, and on the production side, for a large share of total employment. In Indonesia, the staple food, rice, represents 7.2 per cent of average consumer expenditure.
1 Its production employs 7.1 per cent of the total work force at the farm level alone. These points apply with particular force for the lowest income groups, for whom the average share of rice in total consumption and the dependence on rice production as a source of employment are both much greater than for the general population. For example, for that part of the workforce with only primary school education or less, the production of paddy (rice produced at the farm level)
accounts for 18 per cent of total employment.
Indonesia is a net importer of rice, though the magnitude of its imports varies from year to year depending on domestic production, international prices and the size of Indonesia's stocks. Over the 4 years following the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 (1998 to 2001, inclusive) Indonesia's rice imports were 9.1 per cent of its total consumption of rice and 18 per cent of the world's total imports, making Indonesia the world's largest importer. Thailand was the largest exporter, followed by Vietnam and the US.
Prior to the 1997-98 crisis Indonesia's rice imports were monopolized by a public agency, Bulog. Figure 1 shows that except for the periods of the 1973 commodity price boom and the 1997-98 exchange rate crisis, the real price of rice in Indonesia has been relatively stable, but that its post-crisis level was above its level over the previous three decades, even though international rice prices have declined relative to other traded commodities. From this and from Figure 2 it is apparent that the effects of Bulog's market interventions were to stabilize rice prices relative to international prices at a level not significantly different from the trend level of world prices (Timmer 1996) . With the exchange rate volatility of the crisis period, local currency prices of imported rice surged. Despite this, Indonesian domestic prices remained well below exchange rate adjusted world prices, for a brief period, but from about 2000 until late 2004 they stabilized at levels 40 to 50 per cent above import prices.
The large difference between the domestic and import price arose from changes in rice import policy which followed the 1997-98 crisis. Bulog's monopoly on rice imports was abolished in 1998, but this agency still accounted for around 75 per cent of total imports. From 2000 onwards, private imports were subject to a specific tariff (rather than an ad valorem tariff) of Rp. 430 per kg, which in mid 2002 was around 25 per cent of the import price (c.i.f.). In addition, private sector rice imports were subject to "red lane" customs treatment, meaning stricter standards of customs inspection than other food items, and were also subject to special import licensing requirements. The tariff plus these non-tariff barriers apparently account for the increased difference between the border price of imported rice and domestic prices.
In 2003 per cent to about 45 per cent. The tariff increase was reportedly opposed by the Ministry of Finance, which has ultimate responsibility for all taxes. In early 2004 a ban on rice imports was introduced. 2 The ban was said to be 'seasonal', but a year later it remained in place. Nevertheless, special exemptions and a certain amount of smuggling apparently still permitted some imports of rice to occur.
A truly 'seasonal' ban -one implemented only during specific, pre-announced times of the year -would have little effect. Anticipating the ban, importers would stockpile imports during periods when the ban was not in place, hoping to benefit from higher prices during the ban season. Holding the international price constant, the effect would merely be to force importers or others to incur more storage costs than would otherwise be optimal; due to these costs, there would be a small price increase during the period of the ban, compared with the price that would otherwise obtain, but otherwise no effect. To be effective, a ban must be permanent, or at least 2 Since an import ban is not a tax, the Ministry of Finance does not have jurisdiction over it.
unanticipated. On the other hand, a seasonal ban is capable of insulating the domestic price from temporary fluctuations in the international price which might occur during the period of the ban and which would otherwise be transmitted to the domestic price.
The argument for protection
Arguments supporting restrictions and/or tariffs on rice imports have come in part from Bulog and the Ministry of Agriculture. First, it has been said that without protection Indonesia's rice sector cannot achieve the goal of rice self-sufficiency -a strongly held objective of some of Indonesia's political leaders despite its lack of any sound economic foundation. In its preoccupation with food self-sufficiency, Indonesia is not different from many other staple food importing countries, at least those which are also significant producers of these commodities.
Second, protection has been said to be necessary because world rice prices are 'distorted' by export subsidies in major exporting countries. This argument is seemingly no stronger than the first. If rice import prices were to be permanently depressed by exporter policies which amount to 'dumping', then no matter how 'distortionary' these policies may be, Indonesia's most rational policy would be to adjust to this feature of its international environment and reallocate resources accordingly, rather than to protect its domestic economy from the cheaper imports which the exporting countries now, so kindly, provide.
Finally, and most controversially of all, protection has been said to be desirable because of its favorable income distributional effects. Compared with free trade, protection would supposedly reduce poverty by raising the incomes of poor farmers.
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The argument against protection
Critics of protection for the rice industry have focused in particular on its distributional effects, arguing that an increase in the domestic price will actually increase poverty incidence. The analysis advanced most frequently distinguishes net producers and net consumers of rice and says that protection benefits the former at 3 Bulog has also claimed that protecting the rice industry is good for the environment, because it would keep irrigated land in rice production that might otherwise become idle. Few observers have agreed that the increased pesticide and fertilizer use that would follow, not to mention increased demand for irrigation water, could have environmental benefits. In any case, there seems little possibility that irrigated land not used for rice production would be left idle; it is too productive not to be used to produce other commodities.
the expense of the latter. The 'net producers' are sellers of rice, meaning farmers owning rice-producing land and renters of this land. The 'net consumers' are rural landless labourers, producers of agricultural commodities other than rice and virtually all urban residents, except for absentee owners of rice-producing land. This group also includes many farmers who produce some rice but who purchase additional rice with the proceeds of the sale of other commodities. It is pointed out that there are more poor people among the net consumers than the net producers. Protection of the rice industry would therefore raise poverty incidence rather than lowering it.
Seemingly strong claims have been made about the degree to which poverty would decline if protection was reduced and, conversely, the degree to which poverty incidence would worsen if it was increased, as desired by the Ministry of Agriculture and Bulog.
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One difficulty with the argument that protection of the rice industry would worsen income distribution is that most, but not all, of those arguing this case have focused on counting the numbers of poor people in each group, disregarding the potentially larger magnitude of the benefit received by each net producer from a price increase than the loss incurred by each net consumer. But this point is not necessarily decisive and there is a potentially more serious problem with the case that has been made against protection.
According to the anti-protection argument, the beneficiaries from a price increase -net producers -include only land holders. Landless labourers employed in the rice sector, which includes vast numbers of poor people, are counted among the net consumers of rice -the losers from protection. These people derive their incomes not from the sale of rice but from the sale of their labour. It is implicitly assumed in the net producer / net consumer framework that a price increase would affect the living costs of these people, through the consumer price which they face, but not their incomes. This in turn assumes that the price increase would not raise the aggregate demand for unskilled labour. If it did, the increase in labour demand would produce some combination of increased employment and increased real wages for landless labourers.
There is reason to think that these effects could be important. Suppose that rice producers respond to the increase in prices with an increase in output. The paddy (rice) industry is a large employer of unskilled labour. If it is also labour-intensive in its production technology, relative to the rest of the economy, in particular, intensive in its use of unskilled labour, then expansion of rice production would increase the demand for unskilled labour -the major asset of the poor -and presumably its price.
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The argument that has been advanced against protection of the rice industry in
Indonesia ignores any such effects.
The nature of crop production is that supply response generally occurs only with some delay -say, six months to two years. The assumption of zero supply response, implying zero income effect for 'net consumers', may be roughly correct for the very short run -say periods of less than one year -but not longer. So long as it remains in place, protection increases the domestic price permanently. How would Indonesian producers respond? It seems likely that the long run supply response in the Indonesian rice industry would be highly inelastic, but this does not mean that it would be zero. The notion that peasant farmers do not respond to price incentives, given sufficient time to adjust their production schedules, is one of the most thoroughly demolished myths in all of economics.
Supply response of domestic rice producers
Several empirical studies have looked at the issue of supply response in the Indonesian context, but their results vary. An early study by Mubyarto (1975) estimated the long run elasticity of planting area with respect to price on Java to be very low, at 0.03. Tabor (1988) estimated that in Java the elasticity of planting area with respect to price was 0.22 in wet land rice production and 0.45 in dry land production. A study by Hutauruk (1996) estimated the planting area response elasticity on Java to be 0.04 and off Java to be 0.78. Since the overall elasticity of supply includes the response of yield to price as well as the response of planted area, the implied output supply elasticities with respect to price will be larger than these estimates.
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A more recent study by Irawan (2001) estimates short and long term elasticities of supply response for several regions and for both wet and dry land rice production. In summary, the available econometric evidence, while thin, supports the view that in Indonesia the overall elasticity of supply response of rice is low, but not zero.
The estimates are higher in the long run than the short run, higher in dry land conditions than wet land conditions and generally higher off-Java than on-Java.
Estimates of the long run elasticity of output with respect to price in the range of 0.2 to 0.4 would be consistent with the available evidence. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that considerable uncertainty remains as to the true value of this key parameter.
The optimal tariff argument
In the case of Indonesia's rice imports there is a possible further case for protection which rests on economic efficiency alone -known as the 'optimal tariff argument'. Strangely, the current debate on rice protection has largely ignored this argument, even though its potential implications are significant. Indonesia is a large importer of rice relative to the world market and seemingly possesses a degree of monopsony power. Because the international price is affected by the volume of Indonesian imports, the marginal cost of Indonesia's imports exceeds the world price.
In these circumstances, starting from a position of zero protection, it is possible to raise national income by restricting imports. The gains in national income are achieved through an improvement in the terms of trade -protection induces a reduction in the price of rice imports relative to export prices in general by reducing the volume of imports. In a famous contribution, Harry Johnson demonstrated that if the elasticity of supply of imports to a country is ε, then the rate of tariff which maximizes national income is 1/ε (Corden 1974 Thailand, the types of rice involved are essentially the same.
Studies of the elasticity of demand for Thailand's rice exports have produced estimates ranging from -2.5 to -5. 7 If the volume of Indonesia's imports was the same as the volume of Thailand's exports, the elasticity of supply of rice imports to Indonesia would be the same as this but with the opposite sign. Over the three years 1998 to 2000, Indonesia's rice imports were about 70 per cent of the level of Thailand's rice exports, implying elasticities of supply of between 3.6 and 7.2. These elasticities imply optimal tariffs of 28 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively.
The central problem with this analysis, however, and with the econometric studies on which it are based, is that the estimated elasticities almost certainly understate the true long run elasticities of world supply. If the world price were to rise permanently, say because a major importer like Indonesia restricted its imports, relative to the level they would otherwise have taken, new suppliers would almost certainly enter the world market. But because these suppliers are not exporters at current world prices, their supply response behavior is not reflected in available statistical data. This means that the optimal tariffs which can be estimated from arguments like those above are almost certainly upper bounds on the reasonable values that an optimal tariff could take.
It would seem likely that a reasonable estimate of the long run elasticity of supply of rice imports to Indonesia would be between 7 and 10 and therefore that 7 This literature is reviewed in detail in Warr (2001) .
tariffs in the neighborhood of 10 to 14 per cent would be the largest that could be justified through the optimal tariff argument. Nevertheless, the true value of the long run elasticity of supply of rice imports to Indonesia must be considered uncertain.
The 'optimal' levels of protection discussed above relate to the maximization of national income and ignore distributional effects. Of course, such protection would also have distributional consequences, which would need to be considered in determining its appropriate level. The analysis presented in this paper shows how this can be done.
The case for a general equilibrium treatment
An adequate analysis of the distributional effects of rice import restrictions needs to take account of its effects on households' expenditures, disaggregated by household group, but also its effects on their incomes. This requires taking account of its effects on the labour market as well as the returns to land. In doing this, the rice industry could not be considered in isolation. An increase in unskilled wages would affect profitability in other industries, with effects on outputs and prices in those industries as well. These effects would have repercussions on household incomes.
These effects would then have to be balanced against the effects on consumers of an increase in the price of rice. But the consumption of rice could not be considered in isolation either. An increase in the price of rice would have implications for the demand for other staple foods, such as those based on corn and wheat flour, another significant import.
For analyzing the distributional effects of trade policy, a general equilibrium treatment is essential. The debate over Indonesia's rice protection illustrates this point. The economic issues involved are complex and interrelated. A framework is required which accounts for these interactions and which simultaneously satisfies all relevant market clearing conditions and macroeconomic constraints. To address issues of poverty and inequality, such a framework must include a disaggregated household sector. Moreover, as the above discussion has shown, the full effects of rice protection depend on the values of key economic parameters, including the supply response of domestic producers and the elasticity of the world's supply of rice imports to Indonesia; but the true values of these parameters are uncertain. A framework is therefore needed in which the values of key parameters can be varied to determine the sensitivity of the results to the assumed values of these parameters.
The following section describes the Wayang general equilibrium model of the Indonesian economy. The next section applies this model to the analysis of the distributional effects of a restriction of rice imports, in particular its effects on poverty incidence. The analysis employs considerable sensitivity analysis around the assumed values of key parameters. The final section concludes.
The Wayang General Equilibrium Model
This study uses the Wayang general equilibrium model of the Indonesian economy (Warr et al. 1998; Wittwer 1999; Warr and Wittwer 2005) . It is based on the Indonesian Input-Output by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics. The SAM identifies ten different types of households, representing ten socio-economic groups. In the present study, each of these 10 SAM household categories is divided into 100 sub-categories of equal population size, with the sub-categories arranged by consumption expenditures per capita -that is, centile groups. That is, the model identifies a total of 1,000 household categories. The advantage of working with a general equilibrium model with a highly disaggregated household sector is that it becomes possible to conduct controlled experiments, which focus on the consequences for household incomes, expenditures, poverty and inequality that arise from different economic shocks, taken one at a time.
As well as disaggregating households, Wayang also has a disaggregated industry and commodity structure. The microeconomic behaviour assumed within it is competitive profit maximisation on the part of all firms and competitive utility maximisation on the part of consumers. In the simulations reported in this paper, the markets for final outputs, intermediate goods and factors of production are all assumed to clear at prices that are determined endogenously within the model. 8 The nominal exchange rate between the rupiah and the US dollar can be thought of as being fixed exogenously. The role within the model of the exogenous nominal exchange rate is to determine, along with international prices, the nominal domestic price level. Given that prices adjust flexibly to clear markets, a 1 percent increase in the rupiah/dollar exchange rate will result in a 1 percent increase in all nominal domestic prices, leaving all real variables unchanged.
Wayang belongs to the class of general equilibrium models which are linear in proportional changes, sometimes referred to as Johansen models, after the seminal work of Johansen (1964) , which also used this approach. It shares many structural features with the highly influential ORANI general equilibrium model of the Australian economy (Dixon, et al. 1982) , which also belongs to this Johansen the exports of an import-competing industry is exogenous. 9 The criterion used to classify these industries is the ratio of an industry's imports to its exports. If this ratio exceeds 1.5, then the industry is regarded as producing an importable. If the import/export ratio is less than 0.5, then the industry is deemed to be export-oriented.
For ratios between 0.5 and 1.5, additional relevant information is used in classifying the industry.
Commodities
Wayang contains two types of commodities -producer goods and consumer goods.
Producer goods have two sources: domestically-produced and imported. All 65 producer goods are in principle capable of being imported, although some have zero levels of imports in the database, services and utilities representing most of the examples. The 20 consumer goods identified in the model are each transformed from the producer goods, where the proportions of domestically produced and imported producer goods of each kind used in this transformation is sensitive to their (Armington) elasticities of substitution and to changes in their relative prices.
Factors of production
The mobility of factors of production is a critical feature of any general equilibrium system. 'Mobility' is used here to mean mobility across economic activities (industries), rather than geographical mobility. The greater the factor mobility that is built into the model, the greater is the economy's simulated capacity to respond to changes in the economic environment. It is clearly essential that assumptions about the mobility of factors of production be consistent with the length of run that the model is intended to represent.
Two types of labour are identified: 'unskilled' and 'skilled'. They are distinguished by the educational characteristics of the workforce: skilled labour is defined as those workers with lower secondary education or more. Both types of labour are assumed to be fully mobile across all sectors. These assumptions imply that skilled wages must be equal in all sectors. The same applies to unskilled wages, though skilled and unskilled wages can differ and need not move together.
There are two kinds of mobile capital -one that is mobile among agricultural sectors, and another that is mobile among non-agricultural industries. It is assumed that mobile agricultural capital cannot be used outside agriculture and mobile nonagricultural capital cannot be used in agriculture. In this treatment, agricultural capital is thought of as machinery such as tractors of various kinds, which can be used in a variety of agricultural activities. Non-agricultural mobile capital is thought of as industrial machinery and buildings.
Constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production technology is assumed for each sector, with diminishing returns to scale to variable factors alone. However, we introduce a sector specific fixed factor in every sector to assure that there are constant returns to scale in production to all factors. We refer to the set of specific factors in the agricultural sectors as 'land', and to the set of those in the non-agricultural sectors as 'fixed capital'. The assumption of constant returns means that all factor demand functions are homogeneous of degree one in output. In each sector, there is a zero profit condition, which equates the price of output to the minimum unit cost of production. This condition can be thought of determining the price of the fixed factor in that sector. Contrary to what might be supposed, the paddy industry is not particularly intensive in its use of unskilled labour, which accounts for only 4.3 per cent of total costs and 5.25 per cent of total variable costs, both well below other agricultural industries and the rest of the economy, on average. This point will be important for later discussion.
Households
The model contains ten major household categories -seven rural and three urban - The population sizes of the 10 major categories are not the same, but within each of these 10 categories the population sizes of the 100 sub-categories are the same.
5. Rural low income -non-agricultural households, consisting of small retail store owners, small entrepreneurs, small personal service providers, and clerical and manual workers in rural areas 6. Rural non-labour households, consisting of non-labour force and unclassified households in rural areas 7. Rural high income -non-agricultural households consisting of managers technicians, professionals, military officers, teachers, large entrepreneurs, large retail store owners, large personal service providers, and skilled clerical workers in rural areas 8. Urban low income households, consisting of small retail store owners, small entrepreneurs, small personal service providers, and clerical and manual workers in urban areas 9. Urban non-labour households, consisting of non-labour force and unclassified househods in urban areas 10. Urban high income households, consisting of managers, technicians, professionals, military officers, teachers, large entrepreneurs, large personal service providers, and skilled clerical workers in urban areas.
The sources of income of these households are based on the SAM and are summarized in Table 2 . These household categories vary considerably in the composition of their factor incomes, but within the analysis of this paper, the composition of factor incomes is assumed to be uniform among the 100 subcategories of each of these 10 major categories. Of course, the incomes of these 100 sub-categories vary considerably, so they should be thought of as owning varying quantities of a uniform bundle of factors. The composition of the factor bundle varies across the 10 major household categories but is uniform within each. Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of the 10 major household categories in so far as they relate to poverty incidence. Poor people are found in all 10
household categories, at rates varying from roughly 40 percent (Rural 1) to 5 per cent (Urban 3). Within each of these household categories consumption expenditures per capita vary widely. In the simulations conducted below, poverty incidence is calculated for each of the 10 household categories, using poverty lines for each category which replicate the levels of poverty incidence calculated from the Susenas 1999 data set, using official poverty lines. which replicates this level of poverty incidence, using the Susenas data, is shown in the diagram. In the simulations, the real values of these poverty lines are held constant, using household-specific consumer price indices, based on householdspecific budget shares. Poverty incidence at the 'rural', 'urban' and 'total' levels is calculated by aggregating poverty incidence at these 10 household category levels, using their respective population shares as weights (see Table 3 ). This produces an estimate of the base level of poverty incidence at the national level of 23.1 per cent.
The incidence in rural areas (29.1%) is two and a half times that in urban areas (12%).
Inequality is calculated for the rural, urban and total populations by constructing a Lorenz curve separately for each, as shown in Figure 4 , and then using a spreadsheet calculation to estimate the Gini coefficient for each. Figure 4 reveals that inequality is higher in urban than rural areas and higher than for the general population.
The Simulations
The shock
The data base of the model was calibrated to reflect a 25 per cent tariff on rice 
The closure
Since the real consumption expenditure of each household is chosen as the basis for welfare measurement, and is the basis for the calculation of poverty incidence, the macroeconomic closure must be made compatible with both this measure and the single-period horizon of the model. This is done by ensuring that the full economic effects of the shocks to be introduced are channeled into current-period household consumption and do not 'leak' into other directions, with real-world intertemporal This is achieved by endogenous across-the-board adjustments to personal income tax rates so as to restore the base level of the budgetary deficit.
The combined effect of these features of the closure is that the full effects of changes in policy are channeled into household consumption and not into effects not captured within the single period focus of the model.
Results
The starting point for the results is Simulation A, the features of which are summarized in the first column of Tables 4, 5 and 6. For the purposes of the parametric variations performed below, it should be noted that in this core simulation:
♦ The assumed elasticity of supply of rice imports to Indonesia is 10.
♦ CES technology is assumed in all industries and the assumed elasticities of substitution are 0.5 in all industries except paddy (rice production) where the value is 0.25.
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♦ The Armington elasticity of substitution in rice demand (the elasticity of substitution in demand between imported and domestically produced rice) is 6, which implies that imported and domestically produced rice are relatively close substitutes.
Each of these parametric assumptions will subsequently be varied, as summarized in Table 4 . For the time being it is sufficient to focus on the results of Simulation A.
Effects on the market for imported rice
We begin with the effects that the import restriction has on the market for imported rice, summarized in Table 4 . The solutions can best be understood by performing a set of side calculations. The import price of rice in foreign currency (c.i.f.) declines as the volume of imports contracts, but not enough to prevent the domestic price -both the producer price and the consumer price -from increasing. The increase in the domestic price stimulates rice production and reduces consumption.
The magnitude of the reduction in the foreign currency import price can be understood as follows. The rest of the world supplies rice to Indonesia with a supply function given by 11 As will be explained below, this lower value of the elasticity of substitution for rice is chosen to be consistent with the low values of the elasticities of supply response which have been estimated empirically for the Indonesian rice sector. Table 4 .
12 For a technical description of this multi-step algorithm, see Codsi, Pearson and Wilcoxen (1991) . 13 The changes in indicated in simulations B, C and D summarized in Table 6 can be confirmed in the same manner, noting that the values of P R * γ in these three cases are 0.4, 0.2 and 0.05, respectively.
It is notable that if the proportional change approximation, equation (2), was used to estimate this price response, the result would be highly inaccurate.
The calculation would be, inverting (2), p * R = γq R = 0.1×90 = 9. That is, this approximation would give an estimate of the percentage change in the c.i.f. price of less than half the value obtained by solving the appropriate levels equation, given by (1). Large errors of this kind can arise from using proportional change approximations when (i) the shocks are large, as in this case, and (ii) the underlying equation in levels is highly non-linear, as is the case with (1) and (3).
From Table 4 , the import restriction raises the domestic (landed) price of imports by a massive 62.51 per cent. This generates a large quota rent, which is equivalent to an increase in the initial tariff, in ad valorem terms, of 104 per cent.
This result may be interpreted in the following way. The import restriction raises the domestic price from 1 to 1.6074 and lowers the import price price, as described above, from 1 to 0.7959. Writing P R for the domestic price of imported rice, the proportional tariff equivalent of the quota is then given by , where t
and thus t = (P /P * ) −1 giving = 1.6074 / 0.7959 -1 = 1.0396, or 104 per cent. That is, as indicated in the final row of Table 4 , a 90 per cent effective import quota raises the domestic price by an amount equivalent to a 104 per cent tariff, in addition to any tariff that was in place before the quota. The 'seasonal import ban' is an extremely protectionist measure. The solutions for simulations B to N summarized in Table   4 can be understood in a similar way.
Macroeconomic results
The macroeconomic results are summarised in Table 5 . Perhaps surprisingly, the increase in rice production does not induce an increase in real unskilled wages. The reason for this result is that while rice production uses large quantities of unskilled labour, according to our education-based definition of this category, the paddy industry is not intensive in its use of unskilled labour. This point is summarized by the data shown in Table 1 and discussed above. The cost share of unskilled labour in the paddy industry is only 4.3%, less than the average for all industries (8.5%) and less than the average for other agricultural industries (9%). Unskilled labour cost as a share of all variable factor costs (excluding land and fixed capital) is far below the economy wide average. When the paddy industry expands, large quantities of intermediate goods are demanded, such as fertilizer, but small additional numbers of unskilled workers are hired; unskilled wages fall, in real terms, rather than rise. This point is particularly relevant for the simulated effects on poverty.
Effects on poverty and inequality
The simulated effects on poverty and inequality are summarised in Table 6 .
The results have the following important features.
(i) Overall poverty incidence rises. The changes in real consumption expenditures are dominated by increased living costs, resulting in a reduction in the real expenditures of the poor and an increase in poverty incidence. Poverty incidence increases in all household categories, in both rural areas and urban areas, but the increase in urban areas (around 0.3%) is smaller than the rural increase (around 1%). The central reasons are (i) urban budget shares for rice are in general well below rural budget shares, and (ii) the real return to unskilled labour declines and urban households receive, on average, a lower share of total income from this source.
(ii) Overall inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) increases very slightly. Inequality increases in both rural and urban areas, but the magnitudes are trivial. The increase in rural inequality is a consequence of the increase in the return to land, which rises relative to the return to unskilled labour. The increase in urban inequality arises from the decline in real skilled and unskilled wages, which raises the return to capital.
(iii) Within each of the10 household categories, the sub-category households are not affected uniformly. This is an interesting feature of the results and is illustrated in 
Effects of Varying Key Parameters
To what extent do the results summarised above depend on the assumed values of key parameters assumed in Simulation A? This question is important, because the above discussion indicates that considerable uncertainty attaches to the true values of several parameters which seem particularly relevant. Variations in these parameters will now be discussed. We shall vary, in turn, the elasticity of supply of rice imports to Indonesia, the elasticity of supply response of paddy with respect to its price, and the Armington elasticity of substitution in demand between domestically produced and imported rice.
The elasticity of supply of rice imports
Simulation A assumes that imports of rice are available to Indonesia with an elasticity of supply of 10. Values of 2.5, 5 and 20 are also considered, and the simulated implications are summarised in detail in Tables 5 and 6 . The implications for poverty incidence at the national, rural and urban levels are summarized graphically in Figure 7 . Poverty increases in every case, including both rural and urban poverty incidence. It is argued above that values of this parameter below about 5 are implausible, but even in such cases poverty incidence increases.
Lower values of the supply elasticity of rice imports to Indonesia imply larger terms of trade effects for a given level of import restriction, but these terms of trade effects are insufficient to prevent increased poverty incidence. The reason is that when the elasticity of world supply is low, very large increases in the domestic price of imported rice are required to achieve the 90% reduction in the quantity of imports. Although the import price is forced down by the reduced quantity of imports, from the viewpoint of domestic consumers this price reduction is more than compensated by the implicit tax on rice imports. Improved terms of trade make possible increased imports of other goods, but this effect is dominated by the increased price of rice.
The elasticity of supply response of paddy with respect to its price
It can be shown that the partial equilibrium elasticity of supply response with respect to the price of output is related to the parameters of the model by the Poverty incidence increases throughout the range.
The elasticity of substitution in paddy production has no bearing on the expenditure-side effects that are the dominant source of the increased poverty, but it does affect changes in incomes. The larger this elasticity of substitution, the greater the supply response and the smaller is the reduction in the real wages of unskilled labour, and hence the smaller the increase in poverty incidence.
Nevertheless, this effect is too small to change the qualitative effect on poverty incidence.
The Armington elasticity of substitution in rice demand
When the Armington elasticity of substitution in demand between imported in domestically produced rice is varied, the estimated increases in poverty incidence are affected only trivially, as shown in Figure 9 . Variations in the assumed Armington elasticity do not turn the simulated poverty increase into a reduction in poverty, nor do they turn a 'moderate' increase in poverty incidence into a 'large' one.
Higher values of this elasticity imply closer substitution between imported and domestically produced rice. However, this does not translate into larger increases in the price of domestically produced rice, for a given level of quota restriction, as it would with a fixed ad valorem tariff, but rather smaller increases in the landed price of imported rice. This feature of the results is shown clearly by Table 4 (see the columns for Simulations I to N). Imports are a small share of domestic consumption. Greater substitutability between imports and domestic rice reduces the rents obtainable from the quota on imported rice. The increase in the consumer price of rice, including both imported and domestically produced rice, actually declines as the Armington elasticity is increased and the estimated increase in poverty incidence is correspondingly slightly smaller.
Conclusions
The analysis presented in this paper indicates that a 90 per cent effective ban on Indonesia's rice imports increases poverty incidence in that country by a little under 1 per cent of the population. This result is based on a general equilibrium analysis which disaggregates households in considerable detail and which varies the assumed values of key parameters across the seemingly plausible range. For all plausible parametric assumptions which were considered, poverty incidence increases as a result of the import restriction. The increase in poverty incidence is moderate but significant, and occurs in both rural and urban areas. It is not possible to justify the import ban by claiming that it reduces poverty. 
